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Abstract 
 
This study investigated the sustainability of global tourism in 163 countries for the period 
2010 to 2015. Given the richness of the dataset, the data has been decomposed into 11 
fundamental characteristics based on income levels, legal origins and openness to the sea. The 
empirical evidence was based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Three main 
hypotheses were tested from which three broad findings were established. First, Hypothesis 1 
is overwhelmingly valid because persistence in tourist arrivals is consistently an increasing 
function of income levels. Hypothesis 2 is not valid because French civil law countries are 
associated with comparatively higher levels of persistence in tourist arrivals. Hypothesis 3 is 
invalid because landlocked countries reflect higher levels of tourism persistence.  
 
JEL Classification: D74; Z32; Z38  
Keywords: Tourism Sustainability, Income Level, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This study was motivated by two main factors:  the relevance of sustainable tourism and gaps 
in the literature. The two factors are substantiated in chronological order.  First, sustainable 
tourism is important to ensure a constant stream of income for economic development, 
especially for economies that depend substantially on the tourism industry for economic 
prosperity. Moreover, ensuring “sustainable tourism” is more likely to be inclusive than 
“temporal tourism” because the former is potentially more likely to benefit most factions of 
society. This inclusive dimension is necessary for sustainable tourism because terms such as 
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“inclusive” and “sustain” are indispensable in the conception and definition of “sustainable 
development” (Amavilah et al., 2017). The phenomenon of “sustained tourism development” 
can also be acknowledged as “persistent tourism development” which translates a 
phenomenon of hysteresis based on the evidence past values of tourism positively influence 
future propensities to tourism.   This study is positioned on assessing persistence in global 
tourism partly because of the gaps in the tourism literature. 
 The recent tourism literature has fundamentally focused on determinants of tourism, 
without articulating the notion of persistence in factors driving tourism (Sönmez et al., 1999; 
Seddighi et al., 2001; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Kingsbury & Brunn, 2004; Sönmez & Graefe, 
1998; Saha & Yap, 2013; Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Mehmood et al., 2016). We deviate from 
this stream of literature by focusing on the lagged estimated tourism variable as our main 
independent variable of interest. This is contrary to the mainstream literature, which has 
focused on the conditioning information set in the investigation of factors that drive tourism. 
To make this assessment, a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique is employed 
as the empirical strategy. In order to increase room for policy implications, the rich dataset is 
decomposed into fundamental characteristics of tourism based on income levels, legal origins 
and openness to sea. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings, the intuition, and resulting testable hypotheses. The data and methodology are 
engaged in Section 3, whereas Section 4 presents the empirical results and corresponding 
discussion. We conclude in Section 5 with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinning, intuition and testable hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings  
The theoretical framework for persistence in tourism builds on recent empirical literature on 
persistence in inclusive development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) and banking sector 
(Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; Goddard et al., 2011) developments. This theoretical underpinning 
is consistent with the literature on income convergence which has been substantially 
documented within the framework of neoclassical growth estimations (Barro, 1991; Barro  &  
Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986), and recently  extended to 
other domains of economic development, inter alia: financial market performance (Narayan 
et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013) and inclusive human development (Mayer-
Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014).  
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 It is important to recall that in the post-Keynesian era, nascent theories of economic 
growth became prominent with the rise of the neoclassical revolution, which facilitated 
convergence or decreasing differences in income levels across countries. Within this 
framework, notions of market equilibrium have been substantiated to articulate some 
foundations of economic growth theories which predict absolute reduction in cross-country 
differences in income. Such convergence was established to be the outcome of policies that 
are favourable to “free-market competition” (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010). Seminal inquiries had 
established income divergence (or the absence of convergence) and substantiated such 
evidence with, inter alia: variations in initial development conditions and the possibility of 
multiple equilibria (see Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997). Conversely, another theoretical strand 
argues that irrespective of initial conditions, decreasing cross-country differences in income 
levels is feasible from the perspective of countries’ long-run equilibrium or common steady 
state (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 Given the above emphasis, both schools of thought agree on the criterion with which 
to establish convergence; a criterion which is relevant in determining persistence in the 
outcome variable. Hence, our purpose is not to take sides in the debate, but to build on the 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings employed by both schools of thought to either 
confirm or reject a hypothesis of convergence. Accordingly, from the perspective of tourism, 
contingent on fundamental features and corresponding sub-panels, the findings of this study 
may be sympathetic with either school of thought.   
 
2. 2 Intuition for comparative development and testable hypotheses  
 The intuition motivating the choice of characteristics underlying the comparative 
development in tourism is consistent with recent literature on comparative development (see 
Narayan et al., 2011; Mlachila et al., 2017; Beegle et al., 2016; Asongu & le Roux, 2017; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b). In what follows, we substantiate the intuition for the choice 
of these fundamental characteristics of comparative tourism development, notably: income 
levels, legal origins and openness to sea. The association between tourism and underlying 
factors is discussed in chronological order.  
 First, with regard to income levels, relative to low income levels, we expect tourism to 
be comparatively more persistent in high-income countries because such countries are 
associated with more instruments (financial, logistical and infrastructure) with which to 
maintain attractive avenues for tourists on the one hand and prevent negative externalities 
from factors that potentially discourage tourists, on the other hand. For instance, Gaibulloev 
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and Sandler (2009) have established that the negative consequences from terrorism are more 
apparent in low-income countries vis-à-vis their high-income counterparts since the former set 
of countries have less technological, logistical and financial means needed to absorb the 
negative macroeconomic impacts of terrorism. These negative consequences include: terror-
related incidents, injuries, fatalities and damaged properties (Asongu et al., 2019a; Asongu & 
Acha-Anyi, 2019). Even in the absence of natural tourist destinations, high-income countries 
can use their wealth to create artificial tourist destinations.  
 Moreover: (i) institutions have been documented to substantially influence economic 
development on a multitude of fronts (Fosu, 2013a, 2013b; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; 
Efobi, 2015); (ii) high-income countries are more associated with better institutions (Asongu, 
2012) and (iii) institutions determine tourism and planning (Alipour & Kilic, 2005). Given 
these insights, it is logical to infer that high-income countries manage the tourism sector better 
vis-à-vis their low-income counterparts. In the light of these advantages from high-income 
countries, we expect tourism to be more sustainable or persistent in high-income nations 
compared to low-income nations.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to low-income countries, high-income countries are associated with 
more persistence in tourism.  
 
 Second, there is some consensus on the importance of legal origins in comparative 
economic development (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Agbor, 2015). Beck et al. (2003) have 
theorised that English common law counties have better institutions compared to their French 
civil law counterparts because of political and adaptability mechanisms. The political channel 
postulates that English common law places more priority on private property rights, vis-à-vis 
the power of the State, which is the focus of French civil law. The adaptability channel holds 
that the English common law is more likely to adapt to evolving and changing conditions 
compared to French civil law. These advantages provide enabling conditions for the 
development of business (including tourism). Therefore, the institutional web of informal 
rules, formal norms and enforcement characteristics handed down by former colonial powers 
is very likely to affect the climate of tourism.  
 
Hypothesis 2: English common law countries have higher persistence in tourism when 
compared to their French civil law counterparts.  
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 Third, consistent with recent literature, there are institutional and economic costs 
linked to landlockeness (Arvis et al., 2007; Asongu & le Roux, 2017). One of such costs is the 
lack of touristic amenities that are direct externalities of the sea. If follows from intuition, that 
countries that are opened to the sea should comparatively have better initial endowments that 
are conducive for the development of tourism.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Landlocked countries are associated with less persistence in tourism compared 
to countries that are opened to the sea.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study investigates a panel of 163 countries with data for the period 2010 to 2015 from a 
multiple of sources, notably: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); a Qualitative assessment by the 
Economic Intelligence Unit(EIU) analysts’ estimates; the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends; the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 
(CTS) and the United Nations Committee on Contributions. In accordance with recent tourism 
and development literature, the geographical and temporal scopes are based on data 
availability constraints (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2019; Asongu et al., 2019b).   
 The main dependent variable is the number of tourist arrivals while variables in the 
conditioning information set include: Security Officers & Police; Homicides; Incarcerations; 
Conflict Intensity and the United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). These indicators 
in the conditioning information set have been documented in the literature as determinants of 
tourist arrivals, notably: Sönmez et al. (1999); Seddighi et al. (2001); Pizam and Fleischer 
(2002); Kingsbury and  Brunn (2004); Sönmez and  Graefe (1998); Saha and  Yap (2013); 
Alvarez and  Campo (2014) and; Mehmood et al.(2016). 
In accordance with the narrative of Section 2, the following comparative fundamental 
features are used, namely:(i) income levels (consisting of High income, Upper middle income, 
Lower middle income and Low income); (ii) openness to sea (Landlocked and  Coastal 
countries) and  (iii) legal origins (English common law, French civil law, German civil law 
countries,  Scandinavian civil law countries and Socialists countries).In what follows, we 
substantiate the information criteria for the choice of these fundamental characteristics, which 
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have been employed in recent comparative development literature (Mlachila et al., 2017; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b)1. 
Classification of countries according to legal origins is consistent with La Porta et al. 
(2008, p. 289) whereas decomposition by income groups builds on the World Bank’s 
categorisation2.  Landlocked versus Coastal countries are apparent from a world map. 
Additional perspectives into the sources of data and corresponding definitions of variables are 
provided in Appendix 1, whereas the summary statistics is presented in Appendix 2. 
Appendix 3 discloses the correlation matrix.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
 The adoption of a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) empirical approach is 
informed by attendant literature on the persistence of economic phenomena (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017). The research motivates the choice of a GMM empirical 
strategy with four main reasons. (i) The numerical value of groups is considerably more than 
the corresponding number of years in each group (i.e. 163 countries > 6 years). (ii) The 
tourism outcome variable exhibits persistence in the light of the fact the correlation coefficient 
between its level and first lag series’ is 0.994 which is more than 0.800 documented as the 
rule of thumb threshold for justifying the use the GMM approach (Tchamyou, 2019, 20120). 
(iii) Given that the GMM approach is based on panel data, cross-country variations are taken 
on board in the estimation exercise. (iv) The empirical approach is tailored such that, the 
concern of endogeneity is addressed from two principal angles, notably: (i) time-invariant 
indicators are employed to control for the heterogeneity that is unobserved while (ii) the 
instrumentation process accounts for simultaneity or reverse causality.   
 The research prefers the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) option which extends the Arellano 
and Bover (1995) estimator in the light of documented evidence that relative to more 
traditional GMM approaches (e.g. difference and system GMM), the option of Roodman 
option produces more efficient estimates and controls for the proliferation of engaged 
instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a;  Boateng 
et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020). 
 Equation (1) and Equation (2) presented below represent the standard procedure for 
estimated system GMM.  
                                                          
1While the motivations for the choice of fundamental features have been postulated in Section 2, in Section 3 we 
discuss the selection criteria for the fundamental characteristics.  
2
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii)upper middle 
income,$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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where, tiT , represents tourist arrivals documented for country i
 
in  period t , 0 is a constant, 
W  is the vector of control variables (United Nations Peacekeeping Funding; Security Officers 
& Police, Incarcerations, Homicides and Conflict intensity), reflects the lagged coefficient 
which is one in this research  because one year is enough to comprehensively capture previous 
information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error 
term.  
 The research also discusses identification and exclusion restrictions properties that are 
imperative, for a robust GMM analysis. The attendant explanatory variables are defined as 
predetermined or suspected endogenous and the indicators that are considered to exhibit strict 
exogeneity are time-invariant variables. The identification strategy is consistent with recent 
literature (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019). The choice of time-invariant variables as strictly exogenous 
indicators is in accordance with Roodman (2009b) who has argued that it is not feasible for 
time-invariant indicators to become endogenous after first difference3.  
 With regard to exclusion restrictions, in the light of the process of identification, the 
time-invariant indicators influence tourism exclusively, via the endogenous explaining (or 
suspected endogenous or predetermined) variables. Furthermore, the underlying assumption 
pertaining to exclusion restriction withstands empirical scrutiny if the null hypothesis for the 
exogeneity of instruments related to the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) is not rejected. Put 
in other terms, the strictly exogenous variables (or instruments) need to explain the outcome 
variable exclusively through the selected mechanisms or predetermined variables.  
 It is relevant to clarify that in the findings that are disclosed in the next section, the 
hypothesis surrounding the exclusion restriction withstands empirical scrutiny if the null 
hypothesis of the DHT is not rejected. This failure to reject the null hypothesis is in line with 
more traditional instrument variable estimation procedures (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
 
                                                          
3Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
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4. Empirical results 
 Table 1 discloses the empirical results. The last column of the table provides findings 
pertaining to the full sample. Four fundamental criteria of are used to assess the validity of the 
GMM models4. Based on these criteria, results of full samples are not valid because the null 
hypotheses of the Sargan and Hansen Overidentifying Restrictions tests are not valid. It is 
important to note that evidence for the validity of models is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the establishment of persistence.  
 To assess persistence in tourism, the lagged estimated tourism indicator should fulfill 
the following criteria: it should be statistically significant and should also be in line with the 
convergence criterion. This attendant convergence criterion maintains that the absolute value 
of the estimated lagged tourism coefficient should be within the remit of one and zero. More 
perspectives into this criterion can be found in the attendant convergence studies (Fung, 2009, 
p. 58; Asongu, 2013, p. 192).It is worthwhile to emphasize that in the reporting of findings 
from GMM estimations, the coefficient that is estimated can be directly disclosed and one 
deducted from the corresponding coefficient to reflect beta (β= a-1). The related convergence 
criterion is <0. In the same vein, the estimated lagged value of the outcome indicator can 
also be reported directly and a different criterion of information(i.e. “0< lagged value <1”) is 
used to assess the if convergence is apparent or not (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, p. 459; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23).  
 In the light of the above, the comparative criterion for more persistence in tourists’ 
arrivals is simple to follow: for two sub-samples being compared, the sub-sample with a 
higher estimated lagged value of the outcome variable is considered to reflect more 
persistence in tourists’ arrivals. The magnitude of the estimated lagged value is important 
because it translates to how past values of tourist arrivals affect future values. Hence from a 
comparative standpoint, higher estimated lagged values imply that past values affect future 
values more proportionately.The use of the lagged outcome variable to assess persistence has 
been justified with contemporary literature (Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Meniago, 2018).The 
significance of the control variables (i.e. variables in the conditioning information set) varies 
across sub-samples. It is normal that the significance of control variables should vary across 
                                                          
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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sub-samples in the light of the fact that the control variables are also contingent on these sub-
samples. Indeed this is even consistent with the definition of conditional persistence because 
conditional persistence occurs when there are cross-country changes in the determinants of 
the outcome variable which include the elements in the conditioning information set (or 
control variables). Moreover, it also relevant to mention that estimations in which the number 
of instruments is higher than the corresponding number of countries are not considered to be 
robust.  
  
Table 1: Persistence in Tourism with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Tourist arrivals 
             
 Income Levels(Hypothesis 1) Legal origins (Hypothesis 2) Openness to sea 
(Hypothesis 3) 
Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Soc
ial. 
LL NLL Sample 
Constant  0.368 0.868*** 1.557*** 0.836 1.143** 0.700 -0.755 na na 1.349*** 1.035** -0.158 
 (0.119) (0.008) (0.000) (0.200) (0.019) (0.192) (0.217)   (0.009) (0.024) (0.768) 
Tourist arrival  (-1) 0.979*** 0.961*** 0.891*** 0.890*** 0.905*** 0.953*** 1.069***   0.932*** 0.926*** 0.990*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
0.061*** -0.018 -
0.099*** 
0.064* 0.031 0.030 -0.019   -0.129*** 0.026 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.429) (0.009) (0.088) (0.520) (0.406) (0.654)   (0.002) (0.421) (0.735) 
Homicides   0.010 -
0.065*** 
-0.046* 0.082*** 0.030 -0.001 -0.081   -0.031 -0.043 -0.028 
 (0.654) (0.002) (0.066) (0.007) (0.415) (0.974) (0.163)   (0.233) (0.306) (0.432) 
Incarcerations    -0.00007 0.0009 0.096*** -0.071 0.070 0.029 0.108   0.062*** 0.028 0.039 
 (0.996) (0.954) (0.001) (0.200) (0.335) (0.448) (0.277)   (0.009) (0.507) (0.291) 
Conflict Intensity   -0.047** -0.022 0.032 0.031 -0.049 -0.073* 0.086   -0.065* -0.023 0.053 
 (0.015) (0.376) (0.256) (0.694) (0.231) (0.052) (0.277)   (0.074) (0.619) (0.239) 
Conflict Fought  0.013 0.080*** 0.070** 0.052 0.0009 0.021 -0.395   -0.003 0.071** 0.091*** 
 (0.529) (0.000) (0.014) (0.258) (0.976) (0.534) (0.629)   (0.876) (0.024) (0.006) 
UNPKF  -0.098*** -
0.023*** 
0.007 0.062*** 0.027 0.011 -0.016   0.040*** 0.021 0.034** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.579) (0.001) (0.126) (0.402) (0.344)   (0.000) (0.212) (0.044) 
             
AR(1) (0.035) (0.100) (0.028) (0.375) (0.211) (0.055) (0.180)   (0.044) (0.078) (0.015) 
AR(2) (0.140) (0.753) (0.741) (0.798) (0.463) (0.115) (0.371)   (0.176) (0.916) (0.638) 
Sargan OIR (0.157) (0.224) (0.077) (0.657) (0.012) (0.214) (0.756)   (0.405) (0.015) (0.045) 
Hansen OIR (0.287) (0.182) (0.550) (0.374) (0.398) (0.337) (0.983)   (0.387) (0.131) (0.099) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.579) (0.846) (0.412) (0.855) (0.507) (0.599) (0.850)   (0.476) (0.955) (0.982) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.189) (0.060) (0.570) (0.168) (0.330) (0.227) (0.958)   (0.333) (0.028) (0.016) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.641) (0.212) (0.428) (0.713) (0.248) (0.492) (0.993)   (0.513) (0.205) (0.267) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.036) (0.241) (0.746) (0.048) (0.910) (0.135) (0.417)   (0.175) (0.131) (0.041) 
Fisher 15697*** 13056**
* 
575.87**
* 
133.07**
* 
216.25**
* 
360.21**
* 
2412***   1099*** 157.17*** 234.42**
* 
Instruments 30 30 30 30 30 30 30   30 30 30 
Countries  42 34 42 32 45 80 19   30 120 150 
Observations  166 134 159 118 174 304 75   113 464 577 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests; and b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle-Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle-
Income countries. LI: Low-Income countries. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil 
law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists countries.LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked 
countries. na: not applicable because of issues in degrees of freedom. UNPKF: United Nations Peacekeeping Funding. 
 
Considering the hypotheses under investigation, the following results can be established. 
First, Hypothesis 1 is overwhelmingly valid because persistence in tourist arrivals is 
consistently an increasing function of income levels. Accordingly, in income groups, the 
estimated lagged outcome variable is high in lower middle-income countries (compared to 
their Low income counterparts), higher in upper middle-income countries and highest in high-
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income countries. Hypothesis 2 is not valid because French civil law countries are associated 
with comparatively higher levels of persistence in tourist arrivals, compared to their English 
common law counterparts. It is important to note that, whereas the estimated lagged outcome 
variable for German civil law countries does not meet the convergence criterion (“0< lagged 
value <1”), the other two legal origin sub-samples cannot be estimated owing to issues in 
degrees of freedom. Hypothesis 3 is invalid because countries that are landlocked reflect 
higher levels of tourism persistence.  
The evidence of convergence or persistence established above is contingent on the 
variable employed in the conditioning information set. Whereas the signs and significance of 
these variables vary across sub-samples, what is important to note is that the indicators 
contained in the conditioning information set logically affect the tourists’ location decision. 
Engaging the significance (significant versus non-significant) and sign (positive versus 
negative) of these variables will require the study to delve into sub-sample specificities, which 
is out of scope because the independent variable of interest in the study is the estimated 
lagged outcome variable.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
This study has investigated the sustainability of global tourism in 163 countries for the period 
2010 to 2015. Given the richness of the dataset, the data has been decomposed 
into11fundamental characteristics based on income levels, legal origins and openness to the 
sea. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Three 
main hypotheses have been tested from which three broad findings have been established. 
First, Hypothesis 1 is overwhelmingly valid because persistence in tourist arrivals is 
consistently an increasing function of income levels. Hypothesis 2 is not valid because French 
civil law countries are associated with comparatively higher levels of persistence in tourist 
arrivals. Hypothesis 3 is invalid because countries that are landlocked reflect higher levels of 
tourism persistence. 
 The invalid hypotheses pertain to legal origins and landlockedness. They are discussed 
in chronological order. First, with regard to the legal origin theory upon which the Common 
law versus Civil law hypothesis is based, a number of doubts have been raised. For instance, 
the theory assumes that Common law systems (with a strong role of the judiciary and 
stringent property rights) enhance economic development to a greater extent than Civil law. 
The solidity of this assumption may be questioned with four fundamental shortcomings. First, 
there is doubt in some scholarly circles as to whether it is historically justified to distinguish 
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between Civil law and Common law (Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014). Second, due to 
evolving globalisation, contemporary tendencies make the basis for distinguishing Common 
law and Civil law less persuasive. Third, it may not be apparent why fundamentally, tourism 
will be sustained more averagely in countries with Common law systems purely on the 
hypothesis that its tradition is characterised with more flexibility to changing and evolving 
conditions. Fourth, classification of countries in terms of legal origins fails to account for the 
following: mixture and modification at the time when a foreign law is copied; the weight of 
pre-transplant law and influence of the post-transplant period. It is important to note that, in 
the latter period, laws that are transplanted can be altered or applied distinctly compared to the 
country of origin.  
 Second, with regard to landlockedness, a reason the hypothesis does not hold may be 
that cross-country variations in indicators contained in the conditioning information could be 
inconsistent with the assumption of cross-country differences in tourist arrivals based on 
whether a country is open to the sea or not. In essence, persistence in the tourist arrivals is 
contingent on the indicators selected and empirically engaged (Narayan et al., 2011). Hence, 
in some cases or for some fundamental characteristics, the indicators adopted in the 
conditioning information set may not fully reflect the basis for using the selected fundamental 
characteristic to categorise countries. This drawback, which doubles as a caveat to the present 
study, builds from the theoretical perspective that, conditional convergence is more likely to 
take place when there are cross-country differences in determinants that influence tourists’ 
arrivals. Therefore, by extension, the conclusions of this paper are contingent on the 
determinants of tourism we have introduced in the models. The numerical value of the 
determinants is not an issue because recent empirical literature on persistence is based on a 
fewer number of determinants. For example, Bruno et al. (2012) have used two control 
variables. Future studies can focus on country-specific studies in order to articulate findings 
with more country-specific relevant policy implications. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables and countries  
  
Panel A: Definitions and sources of variables 
  
Tourism  Logarithm of the number of tourists arrivals  
  
Internal conflicts fought Number and duration of internal conflicts 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-
State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics 
and Peace (IEP) 
  
Intensity of internal 
conflict  
Intensity of organised internal conflict 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
United Nations 
Peacekeeping Funding. 
Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP 
  
  
Panel B: Sampled  countries (163) 
 “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; 
New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua 
New Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden;Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).   
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
      
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Tourism (Ln) 14.450 1.761 8.987 18.243 732 
      
Internal conflicts fought 1.458 1.024 1.000 5.000 977 
      
Intensity of internal conflict  2.412 1.162 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Security Officers& Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
United Nations Peacekeeping Funding. 2.291 1.164 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Ln: logarithm. Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix(uniform sample size: 731) 
        
InterconfF InInterconf Homicides Incarcerations  SO & P UNPKF Tourist  
1.000 0.514 0.179 -0.125 -0.071 0.106 -0.075 InterconfF 
 1.000 0.320 -0.073 0.014 0.289 -0.352 InInterconfF 
  1.000 0.184 -0.024 0.320 -0.352 Homicides 
   1.000 0.274 -0.151 0.259 Incarcerations 
    1.000 -0.032 0.111 SO &P 
     1.000 -0.399 UNPKF 
      1.000 Tourist 
        
InterconfF: Internal conflicts fought. InInterconf: Intensity of internal conflict. SO &P: Security Officers & 
Police. UNPKF: United Nations Peacekeeping Funding.  
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